On the Political Economy of Urbanization: Experimental Evidence from Mozambique*

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Abstract

Urbanization is a force for economic structural change and is underway in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the slow pace of these transformations in some countries likely results from contrary political interests at the central level. We study the political impacts of a randomized program integrating rural migrants in Mozambique, sponsored by a city government. In the program, local leaders had an active role in the face-to-face coaching of migrants. When looking at behaviors around the municipal elections of 2023, we find that the program increased the political mobilization of local leaders whom we observe conducting more electoral campaigning. Migrants turn out to the election more often, measured by recording inked fingers, and are observed to use more political objects, despite the limited labor market impacts of the integration program. We conclude that helping urbanization can be in the political interest of local governments.

Keywords: political economy, urbanization, rural migrants, migrant integration, political behavior, Mozambique, Africa.
JEL Codes:D72, O18, J61, O12, 055.

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1 Introduction

Urbanization and structural change in the economy are important features of economic development (Kuznets, 1971). While the world has urbanized at an unprecedented rate in the last decades, this process has lagged behind in Sub-Saharan Africa (United Nations, 2018). This is despite significant positive wage gaps between urban and rural areas in that region (Young, 2013; Gollin et al., 2014; Hamory et al., 2021), relevant long-term human capital benefits of migrating to urban areas (Alesina et al., 2021; Cockx, 2021; Nakamura et al., 2022; Van Maarseveen, 2022), and the pressures of climate change (Henderson et al., 2017).[1] It is possible that important frictions could be impeding these flows,(Lagakos, 2020) which opens the stage for thinking about the right policies to overcome these frictions (Glaeser & Xiong, 2017; Bryan et al., 2020).

At the same time, there is a clear sense that urbanization is related to politics: this is valid across both destination (Mayda et al., 2022; Alesina & Tabellini, 2024) and origin (Batista & Vicente, 2011; Docquier et al., 2016) locations of rural-to-urban migrants. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is likely that urbanization improves democracy by facilitating collective action and accountability (Glaeser & Steinberg, 2017). However, perhaps for that reason, there are important frictions to urbanization imposed by politics through policy in that region. One example is land rights, which are often limited and controlled politically (see Byamugisha (2013) for a review of related policy), constituting a fundamental impediment for peasants to leave rural areas. It is then important to align political interests with effective policies that promote development through urbanization.

In this paper, we study the political effects of a policy enacted by a city government in Mozambique aiming to integrate rural migrants. Mozambique has one of the largest agriculture employment proportions in the world and is an appropriate representative of the region in that respect. It also has a ruling party (FRELIMO) that has dominated the politics of the country since independence with a tight control over rural areas, namely through appointed local leaders who have authority over land allocation. Urbanization is underway in the country[2] but has been slowed down by ruling party policy in face of the fear of losing political control over the country. In fact, it is in a few cities that the opposition has gained ground and controls a few municipalities. The policy we study was sponsored by the municipality of Quelimane, one of those opposition-held cities.

We designed and implemented a field experiment in which we randomized access to an integration

[1] Ravallion et al. (2007) remind us that urban poverty should not be disregarded when thinking about urbanization.

[2] This is particularly the case since recently, as a number of natural resources have been explored in the country (Gollin et al., 2015).

program by recent rural migrants to the city of Quelimane. This program entailed the face-to-face coaching of migrants in several rounds of visits to their houses. The main component of the contents package was job matching of the migrants with opportunities in the city. For that purpose several censuses of jobs were implemented in the city. Migrants were given information about jobs while taking into account their preferences. Migrants were also given information about how to use mobile money services, as a way to facilitate their transfers to their origin households. Finally, they were also given information about the city, its public services, and voting. Importantly, in the main variation of this program, it was implemented with the active participation of local leaders at the lowest administrative level.

The experimental design included comprehensive measurement of outcomes through behavioral measurements of political outcomes, as well as several rounds of surveys of local leaders and migrants. Specifically, we measure voter participation in a municipal election more than one year after the program started through observing inked fingers shortly after the ballots were open for voting. We also observe the political mobilization of leaders through designed activities related to campaigning efforts during the same election. And we observe whether migrants hold political objects of different kinds. These behavioral measurements allow us to minimize biases of standard survey questions about politics (Aker et al., 2017; Grácio & Vicente, 2021). Our survey measures allow us to measure familiarity with the program, leaders' views about migrants, and the economic impacts of the program on migrants.

We find that when local leaders helped implementing the program, it improved leaders' views about migrants, who became more understanding of their problems. The social proximity of leaders with the migrants in their jurisdictions increased substantially. Importantly, leaders became more mobilized in campaigning, namely with the migrants, suggesting that the program was used as part of the clientelistic exchanges of leaders during the electoral campaign we observe. At the same time, we observe higher participation rates of migrants in the election, as measured by inked fingers, as well as higher levels of political engagement. This is despite the fact that the program was not particularly effective in terms of labor market outcomes: migrants were exposed to more job opportunities, but are not more likely to be working around one year after the beginning of the intervention. They are however working more hours. When the program had no participation from the leaders most of the treatment effects on political outcomes become insignificant. We infer from this set of results that the policy we study aiming to integrate rural migrants in a Mozambican city is in line with the political interests of the local government, making it a good candidate for effective and development-oriented change in urbanization policy.

Our paper relates to the branches of the literature on the politics and the policies of urbanization.

The literature on the political economy of urbanization is scarce. Davis & Henderson (2003) show a first correlation between urbanization, democracy, and fiscal decentralization. And, indeed, the recent literature shows that decentralization boosts local development through better public services/policies in developing countries (Gulzar & Pasquale, 2017; Dahis & Szerman, 2024). Majumdar et al. (2004) establish a theoretical relationship between urbanization and the political interests of those in power. Both Hodler & Raschky (2014), and Burgess et al. (2014) find that ethnic favoritism, involving the politically biased geographical allocation of resources, is rampant in countries with weak institutions, namely in Africa.

Closer to our paper, a few recent papers have related politics with policy. Akhtari et al. (2022) show that political turnover in mayoral elections in Brazil affects positively public service provision by local governments. Callen et al. (2023) study public sector absenteeism in Pakistan and observe that a reform was more effective where political competition was greater. In the direction of studying the impact of policy on politics, Blattman et al. (2018) does not find political gains from enacting an anti-poverty program in Uganda. Other related contributions, analyze clientelism in developing countries, an effective political strategy (Wantchekon, 2003) targeting the most vulnerable (Bobonis et al., 2022), which we assume to be an important part of electoral politics in Mozambique.

Turning to policies directed at managing urbanization, Wallace (2014) describes in detail the recent approach of Chinese authorities, including repression and positive incentives from rural areas. Michaels et al. (2021) is an exception, like us, in looking at the impacts of city policy on urbanization in Africa: they find that modest infrastructure investments in Tanzanian cities facilitate long-run neighborhood development. Related, but in the opposite direction, Feler & Henderson (2011) show that withholding public services to the informal housing sector was used in Brazil to deter urbanization.

Our paper is closely connected to the literature studying policies that address frictions to urbanization. Bryan et al. (2014) randomized a small incentive to households in rural Bangladesh to temporarily out-migrate during the lean season. The incentive increased migration, consumption at the origin, and re-emigration after the incentive is removed. Consistently, Bryan & Morten (2019) estimate substantial aggregate productivity gains from reducing barriers to internal labor migration in Indonesia, accounting for movement costs. Also related to the costs of moving, Morten & Oliveira (2018) find clear welfare gains from urbanization movements relatable to road improvements in Brazil. Other important frictions to urbanization relate to information. While McKenzie et al. (2013) observes that migrants can have biased beliefs before migration about their future earnings, Baseler (2023) shows that providing information

about urban earnings increases migration to Nairobi, Kenya, due to hidden earnings by current migrants.[3] Heavier programs directed at rural households and providing assets or cash transfers also yield significant impacts on rural to urban migration and structural change: Ardington et al. (2009) analyze a cash transfer program in South Africa; Banerjee et al. (2021) assess the long-term effects of an asset program targeting the ultra-poor in India; and Balboni et al. (2022) look at a similar program in rural Bangladesh.

The city integration intervention we study in this paper is directly related to three strands of the literature. First, the literature on labor market policy interventions in developing countries.[4] This is reviewed by McKenzie (2017), who finds that many evaluations of these policies find no significant impacts on either employment or earnings. One reason could be that urban labor markets appear to work reasonably well. Consistently, Kelley et al. (2024) find that digital job matching platforms do not improve employment outcomes among vocational training graduates in India: they respond to platform access by increasing their reservation wages, and by working significantly less. However, different studies have found positive employment impacts of job matching interventions: Beam (2016) follow the impacts of a job fair in the rural Philippines for domestic and overseas work: Abebe et al. (2021) evaluate the impact of helping young job seekers signal their skills to employers in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.[5] The second line of work behind our intervention is the one on financial inclusion. Suri & Jack (2016) finds that the M-PESA in Kenya lead to changes in the occupational choice of women from agriculture to business. Batista & Vicente (2024) run a field experiment introducing mobile money in rural Mozambique and conclude that it incentivized rural-to-urban migration. The third and final stream of work relates to persuading local actors to favor the integration of migrants. While Cattaneo & Grieco (2021) shows that a narrative about the positive impact of immigrants on the hosting economy affects natives' behaviour towards migrants, Baseler et al. (2023) finds that redistributing social benefits towards natives turn them more sympathetic about the integration of refugees in Uganda.

This paper is organized as follows. We first describe the context of our study in Mozambique. Then, we describe our experimental design, including treatments, sampling, randomization, measurement, estimation strategy, and hypotheses. Subsequently, we show results and conclude.

[3] In related work, Batista & Narciso (2018) demonstrate that increasing contact between migrants and their families has positive impacts on remittances sent home.

[4] Imbert et al. (2021) find that urbanization leads to labor-oriented technological change and the adoption of labor intensive product varieties.

[5] In related work, Dillon et al. (2024) follow the assignment of small and medium enterprises in Tanzania to be listed in a telephone directory and find that they expand their communication networks, increase sales, and make greater use of mobile money, with positive spillovers to firms in the same village.

2 Context

Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, with the 5th lowest GDP per capita in the world (at USD 1566). This is related to the fact that close to 70% of the population is employed in agriculture, with very low levels of productivity. While 39% of the Mozambican population is living in urban areas in 2023, urbanization has been happening in the country, as this figure has clearly increased in the last 20 years: it was 30% in 2004. However, the proportion of urban population is still clearly below the average of Sub-Saharan Africa (43%) and of the world (57%).[6]

At the same time, Mozambique has been governed by a strong party at the central level (FRELIMO) since independence in 1975. Until the first elections in 1994, the approach was explicitly socialist with tight control of the central government over the territory through appointed local leaders. After that, despite externally-induced economic reforms, the ruling party has not dramatically changed the development and political approach over the territory, maintaining the traditional discourse in favor of rural development, which emphasizes supporting the small peasant, with no clear benefits seen in urbanization.[7] The political interests of the ruling party are difficult to separate from these positions: while in rural areas the ruling party easily controls the population through incentives mediated by appointed local leaders (e.g., who allocate land based on their view of who has been working on it), that is less the case in urban areas. In fact, the ruling party only lets municipal elections happen in cities and it is only in a few of those that the opposition has made some ground and won elections.

Quelimane is one of those cities, as it has been held by the opposition since 2011, when the current mayor, Manuel de Araújo, was elected for the first mandate. He now represents the main opposition party, RENAMO. Like many African cities, Quelimane has grown in recent decades, driven largely by the natural arrival of rural migrants looking for better economic opportunities. Being the capital and largest city of the province of Zambézia, Quelimane has received many rural migrants from that province but also from the rest of the country. The city's population more than doubled since 2010 to reach over 500,000 today, making it the 7th largest city in Mozambique.[8] The city is divided geographically into three administrative layers, depending on the municipal council headed by the mayor: five "administrative posts," which are subdivided into 54 "neighborhoods," which are subdivided into 540 blocks (*quarteirões* in Portuguese). Each block is headed by a block leader, who is appointed by the hierarchical structure stemming from the

[6] All figures were taken from the World Development Indicators 2024, latest available years.

[7] One important example in terms of consistent public policy is the continuing conservative approach over land titling, which is to this day (since independence), held by the state in the whole country.

[8] World Population Review: https://web.archive.org/web/20240123115845/https://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/quelimane-population.

mayor.[9]

Block leaders are therefore the lowest level of city government hierarchy. They do not receive formal wages, but enjoy some prestige. Their role consists largely in helping to settle conflicts between block residents, which requires knowing the residents and being aware of when people move in or out. They also serve as a bridge to the neighborhood leaders and the rest of the municipal government hierarchy, being responsible for passing information up the chain about the needs of the block (e.g., resources for coping with floods, which are common in Quelimane), as well as down the chain, enabling the local implementation of public projects (e.g., construction works). The block leader is not a formally partisan position, and less than two-thirds of block chiefs report being registered in a political party (though over 90% of those who were registered during our project belonged to RENAMO). They tend to be respected figures in the block whose opinion carries some weight. Insofar as they owe their position to the incumbent government, their incentives align with its electoral fortunes.

It is important to note that our project was implemented in the final half of the previous mandate of the current mayor of Quelimane and that we measure outcomes during the October 2023 municipal elections in the city. These elections were won by the incumbent mayor/RENAMO after a heated post-electoral period which ended with a supreme court decision supporting RENAMO's allegations of electoral fraud against FRELIMO.

3 Experimental design

3.1 The program

The program we study in this paper provided an integration package to support recent rural migrants in Quelimane, Mozambique. It was sponsored by the corresponding municipality and known as "Quelimane trabalha com todos" (Quelimane works with everybody). The program was tailored to recent rural migrants whom we define as having set residence in Quelimane up to 12 months prior to the beginning of the implementation, and as intending to stay in the city at least one year. It featured individual coaching sessions through five house visits to migrants, entailing approximately one hour of face-to-face contact per visit. The first round of visits was in August 2022 and the last in July 2023. Contents included general information about the city, job matching between the migrant and opportunities in the city, and an intro-

[9]However, there is often some element of popular will in their selection: block residents can propose a candidate for the job, and neighborhood chiefs often approve them.

duction to mobile money. When migrants were not at home, appointments were made to visit at another time. Importantly, in its main treatment variation, the program delivery was mediated by the block leader. We now turn to detailing these contents.

3.1.1 Information contents

The main component of the face-to-face visits was job matching: most of the rural migrants in Quelimane are economic migrants who come to the city in search for better opportunities. Program participants were allocated contacts (name and phone number) of potential job offers to rural migrants. To collect the information relating to these job offers, program administrators conducted two censuses of job offers by visiting every house and establishment in the city as well as four rounds of job updating by phone with the previously collected contacts. We managed to collect approximately 1500 job offers during this project. Enumerators allocated these jobs to specific migrants based on an initial survey of the migrants' job preferences. Each migrant was entitled to up to ten job offer possibilities and given the corresponding contacts. In the last two visits, the enumerator linked each potential employer and migrant by contacting the employer during the house visit and setting an interview date. As a final step, enumerators always sent a text message to each migrant with the potential employers' contacts, names. The main sectors of the job opportunities that were shared in this program included housekeeping, babysitting, cleaning, and gardening.

Another important component of the information package shared through the program was an introduction to mobile money. As part of the face-to-face contact, enumerators shared a presentation on Mozambique's leading mobile money service (M-PESA). It included information on how to open an account, cash-in and cash-out electronic money, as well as to make transfers. In the third round of the visits, participants were given a small endowment (the minimum possible) to cash-in and transfer to a rural family member. It served the purpose of incentivizing the opening of accounts for those not holding one, and trialing transfers to the migrants' origin household using mobile money. The inclusion of this module was guided by the idea that the financial inclusion of migrants is an important dimension of their integration.

Finally, institutional information about the city was added to the package. The first two visits to migrant participants in the program included a general presentation of the city developed by the municipality which encompassed information on the political context of the city, administrative divisions, documentation needed for residence in the city, electoral registration and voting process (namely in face of the 2023 municipal elections), as well as access to local schooling, healthcare, other infrastructures, and

culture. By the third visit, the presentation was incorporated into a survey platform, which allowed to turn it into an interactive experience centered on asking migrants questions regarding the information presented. Figure 1 and Figure 2 present two examples of the shared information.

3.1.2 The role of block leaders

In the main version of the program submission, it contained explicit support and active participation of the block leaders corresponding to the blocks where migrant participants resided. In each round of visits the field team initiated face-to-face conversations with the visited migrants by showing a video on tablets with a short message from the corresponding block leader, who expressed clear support for the program and incentivized migrants to follow the instructions and advice of the enumerators. At the end of each visit, enumerators reminded migrants about the leader's name and contact information to enable reaching him/her in case of necessity. The field team also sent a text message with the leader's name and contacts at the end of the conversation.

Block leaders were encouraged to be present in all rounds of face-to-face contact with the migrants. However their presence was only systematic in the fifth visit when they all participated in the house visits belonging to their corresponding blocks alongside the field team. We note that in the fourth round all leaders were asked to emphasize the relevance of being an electoral participant when filmed for the video to be shown in the face-to-face visits. The content and framing of such message was left at their discretion, with most leaders delivering a political message related to the approaching municipal elections of 2023. In figure 3, a frame from one of these videos is displayed.

3.2 Sampling and randomization

Our baseline sample of recent migrants (as defined above) set the stage for sampling in this project. It was representative of the full population of households containing at least one recent migrant, clustering by city blocks. Our enumerators sampled within each block by starting at a randomly chosen point and following a deterministic algorithm to dictate the order in which they approached households to ask if they included any recent migrants. In all affirmative cases, they conducted a baseline survey interview. In each block, enumerators continued this sampling process until all houses had been visited, or until eight migrant households had been found. This limit was reached in 112 of the 540 total blocks in the city. No migrants were found in a few blocks which made them not eligible for treatment. Our study sample is composed of 497 city blocks. See 4 for the map of Quelimane city displaying these blocks.

We randomly allocated city blocks to three comparison groups: one receiving the full treatment, including the participation of the block leader (leader treatment); one receiving the same integration package but with no participation of the block leader (basic treatment); a control group receiving no intervention. Randomization was stratified within strata of up to three blocks. These strata were created by sorting blocks within neighborhoods by the number of migrants in our baseline survey.[10] The 497 blocks in the study were then split into the leader treatment (168 blocks), the simple treatment (164 blocks), and the control group (165 blocks). All corresponding block leaders were available for measurement.

We note that the sample of migrants in the measurement of our study was recruited in two waves: the initial one already referred, from October to December 2021, and a second wave recruited in September 2022. This second wave of migrants was recruited after treatment had already begun; the first round of the intervention they received was the second, so the treated participants in this wave only received four rounds of treatments in total.[11] We interviewed 2321 migrants in the first wave of recruitment and another 1312 migrants in the second wave.[12]

3.3 Measurement

Our measurement in this field experiment comes from a set of surveys and behavioral activities we organized. We collected survey data from block leaders and migrants at three points in time: baseline (before the intervention), close to the end of the intervention (before the last round), and endline (after the end of the intervention, in August - leaders - and November - migrants - of 2023). All these surveys measured the demographic and socioeconomic traits of the corresponding individuals and households. In addition, they measured civic and political attitudes.

We also formulated and implemented a set of behavioral measures related to political behaviors. The first was a systematic check of inked fingers after the October 2023 local elections in Quelimane of block leaders and migrants. In Mozambique, like in many other countries, voters' index fingers are coloured with purple ink at the polling station after voting. We understood this feature of electoral procedures as a good opportunity to measure political participation in our study participants. To do so, we hired a large team of enumerators who canvassed the whole city in the two days following the election day, checking whether participants' fingers were inked.

[10] Each stratum consists of up to three blocks because some neighborhoods' number of blocks is not divisible by three.

[11] In each wave, we used the same criteria to define (recent) migrants as before. Thus, by the time the program began in August 2023, migrants from the first wave had been in the city for between about 1 to 2 years; migrants in the second wave began the second round of the intervention having arrived in the city at most 12 months prior.

[12] This design allows some variation in treatment effects employing time since migration.

The second behavioral measurement was a Structured Community Activity (Casey et al., 2012) and was based on the distribution of stickers by block leaders praising the mayor for the integration of migrants. Each leader received 40 brown stickers and was instructed to distribute them among households in their blocks. We show an image of this sticker in Figure 5 in Appendix. The protocol encouraged hanging the stickers on the houses' front doors. This allows us to identify stickers visible on migrants' houses as a measure of political mobilization and influence by the block leader.

The third behavioral measurement targeted block leader campaign mobilization as measured by the ability to get together bicycle taxi drivers to campaign for the incumbent mayor (just before the 2023 municipal elections). In this activity, block leaders were instructed to collect contacts of bicycle taxi drivers in their blocks and to summon them at a specific date set by program administrators. Bicycle taxi drivers are the main means of transportation in Quelimane, and highly associated with the incumbent mayor in Quelimane, who initiated and has used bicycle rallies in all his political campaigns. We hoped to measure leaders' campaign efforts and influence through observing whether and how able they were to mobilize bicycle taxi drivers.

The fourth behavioral measurement was directed at migrants and aimed at capturing migrants' political mobilization and partisan support. While surveying migrants at the endline (right after the 2023 municipal election), enumerators looked for displayed political objects in their homes or vests, like stickers, posters, t-shirts, caps, etc. They recorded whether they found any object of that type, including the corresponding party. We note that this behavioral measurement is more credible than the related survey questions about voter mobilization and about which party participants voted for.

In Appendix, we provide a detailed description of all outcome variables we employ in this paper.

4 Estimation strategy and hypotheses

We estimate treatment effects of the leader and basic interventions employing standard econometric analysis of experiments. The following specification is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS):

$$Y_{ibs} = \alpha + \beta_L TL_b + \beta_B TB_b + \lambda_s + \omega \mathbf{Z}_b + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_{ibs} \quad (1)$$

where TL_b and TB_b are indicator variables for living in a block in the leader treatment or the basic

treatment (respectively), λ_s are strata fixed effects, $\boldsymbol{Z}_b$ is a vector of block-level controls,[13] and $\boldsymbol{X}_i$ is a set of individual characteristics[14]. ε_{ib} is an individual-specific error term.

When baseline data are available, we implement an ANCOVA specification by including the dependent variable at baseline ($Y_{ibs,0}$) as a control variable:

$$Y_{ibs} = \alpha + \beta_L TL_b + \beta_B TB_b + Y_{ibs,0} + \lambda_s + \omega \boldsymbol{Z}_b + \gamma \boldsymbol{X}_i + \varepsilon_{ibs}. \quad (2)$$

For outcomes measured in both post-baseline surveys ($t = 1, 2$), we can also estimate effects using multiple measures in time using the following specification (McKenzie, 2012):

$$Y_{ibs,t} = \alpha + \beta_L TL_b + \beta_B TB_b + \sum_{t=1}^{2} \delta_t + \lambda_s + \omega \boldsymbol{Z}_b + \gamma \boldsymbol{X}_i + \varepsilon_{ibs,t} \quad (3)$$

where δ_t boil down to one time dummy distinguishing post baseline periods 1 and 2.

Standard errors are clustered at the city block level in all regressions employing individual migrants outcome variables.

In the analysis of this experiment we follow closely the Pre-analysis Plan we registered at the AEA Registry (AEARCTR-0013066). Our main hypotheses are the following.

First, we expect that the leader treatment increases leaders' awareness of the program, in face of their active involvement in it. Give the added contact with migrants and the nature of the program, we also expect that the leader treatment improves leaders' attitudes towards migrants. Finally, we hypothesize that the leader treatment represents an opportunity to engage politically with migrants in particular, as a clientelistic instrument. Hence, our hypothesis is that this treatment mobilizes leaders in electoral campaigning for the 2023 municipal elections.

Second, we expect that the leader treatment increases migrants awareness of the program, mechanically, in face of implied targeting of migrants. Since the main objective of the program was to integrate migrants into the labor market in Quelimane city, we also expect that the program increases employment and work hours. Finally, our hypothesis is that migrants will be more engaged politically, namely in terms of electoral participation in the municipal elections, and possibly voting more often for the incum-

[13] This is a proxy for the block population.
[14] These are: age, gender, and the baseline survey wave (in the case of migrants).

bent mayor, who sponsored the program.

Linking to the specifications above, and assuming the referred outcome variables to be measured positively, we can summarize our first hypothesis as:

Hypothesis 1: $\beta_L > 0$.

Our design includes a treatment variation that erases the involvement of the leader in the program implementation with migrants. Our expectation is that all referred treatment effects are lower for this basic treatment than for the leader treatment. Block leaders are locally influential figures and are expected to increase the effectiveness of the program. We expect that block leaders are particularly able to influence political outcomes, given the political dimension of their role and its clientelistic nature. Our second hypothesis is then:

Hypothesis 2: $\beta_L > \beta_B$.

5 Results

5.1 Descriptives

We begin by describing our sample of leaders and recent migrants at the baseline. Block leaders in the control group have on average 50 years of age, and are typically male (67%). Seventy-two percent are married or cohabiting and 66% are Catholic. Education levels are relatively low with 22% illiterate and 42% having completed primary school. Ninety-five percent of block leaders own the dwelling where they live. These results are shown in Appendix, Table 13.

The sample of migrants is much younger, with an average of 24 years of age for the control group. Sixty-six percent are male. In face of the mean age, it is not surprising that only 37% are married or cohabiting, and that their average number of children is just over one. Fifty-nine percent of the migrants in the control group are Catholic. In terms of schooling, 34% are illiterate and 32% have completed primary school. Twenty-two percent had no occupation at the baseline. We show these statistics in Table 14 in the Appendix.

Linking to social attitudes, we observe at the baseline that 77% of leaders appreciate the presence of

rural migrants in the city but only two percent think the government is helping the poor. Only 24% of the migrant sample at the baseline had contacted the local leader in the previous year. Fifty percent moved to Quelimane to work. They report their main struggles to be finding a job (33%) and making friends (14%).

These tables also show balance between treatment and control groups. From the 84 tests shown including the null that the characteristics of the treatments are (individually or together) the same as the control and the null that the two treatments are jointly equal to zero in explaining the characteristics of the sample units, we only find seven significant tests at standard levels, well below 10%. This reassures us that the randomization was effective at building comparable groups.

5.2 Leader outcomes

We now turn to treatment effects on leaders. We begin by showing results regarding knowledge of the migrant integration program named "Quelimane trabalha com todos," including who was involved in it. These results are displayed in Table 1. Our regressions employ the stacked specification in equation 3 including both post-baseline periods.

We find that the leader treatment consistently increases knowledge of the program: block leaders are 12 percentage points (pp) more likely to be familiar with the program, significantly at the 1% level. They are also more likely to recognize that themselves (but not their families), block people, and rural migrants were involved in the program, by 19, 12, and 13 pp (all significant at the 1% level). It is interesting to note that the basic treatment is generally not recognized by block leaders. The exception is that block leaders in the basic treatment group identify more often (compared to control) that block people were involved in the program, by 7 pp, significantly at the 10% level. The differences between the two treatment effects are statistically significant for all outcomes except for recognizing leaders' families as having been involved in the program. We conclude that leaders are particularly aware about the program when they were involved explicitly in its implementation.

Table 2 shows results relating to leaders' views about the integration of recent migrants in the city of Quelimane. These views include whether migrants are treated unfairly by community members, whether migrants are positive for the community, and whether the state is helping to integrate migrants in the city. For these outcome variables, we employ a the simple specification in equation 1. We also look at whether block leaders know the migrants in their corresponding blocks. We do this by asking in general about migrants in the block and by asking about the sampled (study) migrants in the block whose names were read when asking leaders. We also employ the share of sampled migrants leaders know. For these

outcomes we employ the stacked specification in equation 3 employing the baseline outcome as a control when available.

We observe that the leader treatment increased the view migrants are treated unfairly, by 9 pp, and that migrants are positive for the community (both significant at the 10% level). It is possible that because of the program leaders became more understanding of the problems and challenges of the migrants, as well as more aware about their contribution to the community. However, despite a positive coefficient, we do not find a statistically significant effect of the leader treatment on the view that the state integrates migrants. Although the effect of the basic treatment is never statistically different from the one of the leader treatment, it is only significantly positive for the view that migrants are positively contributing to their communities. Turning to knowledge of migrants in the block, we find that the leader treatment increased the probability of knowing any migrants in general and any migrants sampled in the study, by 9 and 12 pp respectively (significant at the 5 and 1% levels). We also observe an increase in the share of sampled migrants recognized, by 6 pp (significant at the 1% level). The effects of the basic treatment are statistically insignificant but (statistically) different from those of the leader treatment when employing the study sample of migrants. Block leaders became more aware of recent migrants in their block when they were involved explicitly in the implementation of the program.

We analyze the political outcomes we measured for block leaders in Table 3. There, we show the treatment effects on electoral participation in the 2023 municipal elections, as measured by the observation of inked fingers in the two days after the election day, and the percentage of brown stickers delivered to each leader that was found by our enumerators on the doors of the households in the leader's block just before the election. We also show whether block leaders mobilized any bicycle taxi drivers for political campaigning, the number of drivers on their lists, and the number of those drivers observed by our enumerators attending the pre-set meeting with the corresponding block leader. All regressions employ equation 1 considering we measured these outcomes in just one moment in time.

We do not find statistically significant treatment effects on the voter turnout of block leaders as measured by the inked fingers, although we find sizable positive magnitudes of the treatment effects when taking into account the average level of 90 percent turnout in the control group. We do find clear effects of the leader treatment on all other outcomes considered. The percentage of brown stickers found with households increased by 4 pp, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. This effect is statistically different from the one of the basic treatment. It indicates that block leaders became more interested in using the integration program for campaigning when they were involved in it. Another possibility is that the

treatment allowed leaders to be more effective with voters. We also observe a higher level of mobilization of bicycle taxi drivers in the leader treatment group: the magnitudes are plus 11 pp for the probability of having mobilized cyclists, 1.7 more cyclists mobilized, and 0.7 more cyclists attending the meeting with the leader. Statistical significance of these effects varies between the 5 and 10% levels. Together these findings suggest a clear effect of the leader treatment in the political mobilization of block leaders for campaigning in the 2023 municipal elections. The effect of the basic treatment is not statistically different from that of the leader treatment with respect to the cyclist outcome variables. In fact it is individually significant for the variables using the number of cyclists mobilized/attending (magnitudes are 1.9 and 0.7 respectively, significant at the 10% level).

We conclude that the leader treatment was particularly effective with block leaders. First in terms of recognition of the program. Second in terms of improving the understanding of migrants and the contact with them. Finally, leaders seem to have used the program politically as it induced more campaigning efforts. It is possible that the program was used as a component of the usual clientelistic engagement with voters through which the continuation of benefits (such as those in the integration program) is made contingent on electoral support.

5.3 Migrants' outcomes

Turning to migrants' outcomes, we begin by showing that migrants generally recognize the integration program in its multiple versions. Table 4 displays these results, relating to familiarity with the program and the identification of who was involved in it. We run regressions following the stacked specification in equation 3.

We observe that both treatments were effective at raising familiarity with the program, by 7 and 8 pp for the leader and basic treatments, respectively (significant at the 1% level). We also find that both treatments led to recognizing the migrant him/herself, people living in the same block, and rural migrants to be involved in the integration program sponsored by the city. The corresponding magnitudes are 9 pp, 3-4 pp, and 3-5 pp. Only the leader treatment increases the probability that migrants identify their families to have been involved in the program as well (by 2 pp). Still, this is not statistically different from the effect of the basic treatment. We infer that migrants clearly recognize the program. However, we also note that the control group has high rates of recognition of the program, e.g., 70% mention familiarity with the program. This is likely due to the urban context in which we worked in this study, likely conducive to the spread of information.

The main component of the program intended to facilitate the integration of the recent migrants in the local labor market. Table 5 shows the treatment effects of the integration package on labor market outcomes. We look at whether migrants heard about job opportunities in the previous 12 months to measurement, whether they heard about jobs through the program, whether they are working, and we also analyze the number of hours of work migrants report. We adopt the stacked specification while employing baseline outcomes as controls when they are available, i.e., for the probability of working and the number of hours working.

We find that both treatments increased the probability of hearing about a job in general and through the program. These effects are between 7-8 pp for hearing in general and 10-11 pp for hearing through the program (all effects are significant at the 1% level). The magnitudes are suggestive that the program was the only additional source of information about jobs. Turning to the labor market itself, we observe a positive and significant difference between the leader and the basic treatment effects on the probability that the migrant is working, significant at the 1% level. However, we also find a negative and significant effect of the basic treatment on this probability. Like in other contributions in the recent literature of job matching interventions in developing countries, it is possible that the program did get some people discouraged from working in the process of trying to facilitate matches.[15] However, we do not find this pattern when taking the leader treatment, which we found (above) to be effective with leaders in terms of their mobilization, likely producing better job matches when implemented with migrants. We find a similar statistically significant difference (also at the 1% level) between the two treatments when considering hours worked. However, this time, the leader treatment has a positive and significant effect on hours worked, by 0.4h, significant at the 1% level. We conclude that despite clear effects of the different variants of the program in getting migrants to hear about job opportunities, only the leader treatment has been effective at improving labor outcomes, namely hours worked. This could be related to the role of leaders whom were clearly mobilized in reaching to migrants and extend political proposals to them.

Table 6 dedicates attention to the political outcomes of migrants. Namely, we report on migrant's voter turnout as measured through inked finger observation right after the municipal election of October 2023, on whether migrants display political objects in general and of the mayor's party RENAMO in particular. The later can be understood as an effective measure of electoral support, superior to survey questions on self-reported voting which are prone to various types of biases.[16] We also look at whether migrants

[15] Kelley et al. (2024) show that a job matching platform in India raised job seekers' expectations and hence their reservation wage, making them ultimately less likely to be employed.

[16] Self-reported voting typically inflates voting for the ruling party FRELIMO in Mozambique - see for instance Aker et al. (2017) as well as Grácio & Vicente (2021).

contacted block leaders in the previous four and eight months (to measurement). We employ the simple regression specification in equation 1 for the inked fingers and the contacts with block leaders; and the stacked regression specification in equation 3 for the political objects.

We find a positive and significant effect of the leader treatment on the observation of inked fingers by enumerators. The magnitude is 3 pp, significant at the 10% level. We cannot distinguish this effect from that of the basic treatment. Both treatments were effective at mobilizing migrants for campaigning: political objects are more likely to be observed by enumerators after the election, by 2-3 pp, statistically significant at the 1% level. We also find positive magnitudes for treatment effects on observing RENAMO political objects, but these are only significant (at the 1% level) for the basic treatment. The magnitude of the latter is 2 pp. Interestingly, it is possible that the explicit participation of leaders in the program did not have as strong an impact on voting for RENAMO as the basic treatment (the significance of the difference between the two treatments is at the 10% level). Finally, we find that the leader treatment increased the probability of a contact between the migrant and the block leader (by 6 pp in the previous eight months to the survey, significant at the 1% level). The corresponding effects of the basic treatment are not statistically significant. Consistent with the higher levels of political mobilization by leaders, we infer from these results that when faced with the leader treatment, migrants respond with higher voter turnout and more mobilization in campaigning. However, RENAMO seems to benefit from the basic treatment as well.

6 Concluding remarks

In this paper, we report on a randomized controlled trial we designed and conducted in the city of Quelimane, Mozambique, to understand the political impacts of an integration program involving the face-to-face coaching of rural migrants as they arrive in the city. Importantly, the program was sponsored by the city government and had the active participation of local leaders; it was centered on job matching with the migrants. This is an innovative policy intervention in a rural country where urbanization opposes the political interests of the ruling party. We find that the version of the program involving local leaders in implementation increased their contact with migrants and made them more sympathetic towards migrants. Importantly, we directly observe leaders becoming more mobilized during a municipal electoral campaign, more than one year after the program started. It is possible that they used the program as part of their clientelistic interaction with migrants. At the same time, migrants turned out to vote more often

and were observed more frequently engaging politically during the campaign. This is despite limited changes in their labor market situation, which yielded more working hours.

We believe the implications of these results for development policy are vast. Urbanization and structural change have been an important part of the typical development path. In countries that still have large majorities of their populations in rural areas, often in poverty pockets around subsistence agriculture, often in Sub-Saharan Africa, urbanization is unavoidable. Doing it well requires appropriate policies at the central and local levels. In many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, policy at the central level has opposed urbanization (e.g., land rights have been limited). We have shown in this paper that an integration policy sponsored by a city program can be politically interesting from the perspective of local leaders. Immigrants are often seen as a political problem in many settings around the world. In countries like Mozambique we can infer from our results that it is politically viable for cities to support the integration of rural migrants. City government policy can then be explored as an important channel to target optimal rates of urbanization while influencing the quality of the integration of rural migrants in the cities. When politics and policy are hand-in-hand development is more likely.

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Table 1: Knowledge about the program

	Fam. w/ *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*	Who's involved in the program?			
		Self	Family	Block people	Rural migrants
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.132***	0.186***	-0.004	0.120***	0.127***
	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.033)
(TB) Basic treatment	-0.009	0.022	-0.003	-0.067*	-0.035
	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.032)
Observations	857	857	857	857	857
R^2	0.373	0.350	0.277	0.387	0.399
Mean (control group)	0.716	0.450	0.099	0.397	0.323
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.963	0.000	0.000

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 3. All columns combine the two post-baseline survey waves and present results for the stacked regressions. We did not collect lagged values of any of the presented variables. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Fam. w/ "Quelimane trabalha com todos"*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent has heard of the program "Quelimane trabalha com todos"[17], and 0 otherwise; (2) *Self*: variable equal to 1 if respondent claims to have been involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Family*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent states that his/her family were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Block people*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent states that people living in their same block were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Rural migrants*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent states that rural migrants were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table 7. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table 2: Migrants' Integration

	Migs. treated unfairly	Migs. are positive	Gov. integrates migs.	Knows block migrants		
				General	Sampled	% sampled migrants
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.091*	0.120*	0.078	0.093**	0.121***	0.059***
	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.057)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.018)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.015	0.111*	0.055	0.055	-0.012	0.003
	(0.050)	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.019)
Observations	339	347	343	761	857	857
R^2	0.409	0.466	0.509	0.293	0.309	0.310
Mean (control group)	0.110	0.463	0.632	0.685	0.511	0.159
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.155	0.894	0.702	0.312	0.001	0.005

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1)-(3) use equation 1 whereas columns (4)-(6) use equation 3. In the case of column (4) we employ a version of equation 3 but including in addition the lagged value of the dependent variable (like in equation 2). Columns (1)-(3) use data from the first post-baseline survey wave. Columns (4)-(6) employ the two post-baseline survey waves and present results for the stacked regressions. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Migs treated unfairly*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent considers that migrants are frequently or very frequently treated unfairly by community members, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Migs are positive*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the statement that migrants are positive for the community, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Gov is integrating rural migs*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the statement that the local government is integrating rural migrants in the city, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Knows block migrants General*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent knows any rural migrants living in the same block as self, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Knows block migrants Sampled* the respondent was shown a list with the sampled migrants and asked to select the familiar names - the variable is equal to 1 if the respondent selects at least one name (extensive margin), and zero otherwise; (6) *% sampled migrants*: variable ranging from 0 to 1 indicating the percentage of rural migrants that the respondent selects from the list out of the total migrants sampled in that block. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table 8. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3: Political effort

	Inked finger (1)	% Brown stickers (2)	Mobilised cyclists (3)	# Cyclists mobilised (4)	# Cyclists attending (5)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.048	0.038**	0.112**	1.711*	0.712*
	(0.035)	(0.017)	(0.053)	(0.968)	(0.395)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.037	-0.008	0.078	1.867*	0.664*
	(0.037)	(0.019)	(0.053)	(1.001)	(0.393)
Observations	370	429	429	429	429
R^2	0.353	0.821	0.451	0.516	0.402
Mean (control group)	0.904	0.436	0.629	7.182	1.490
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.741	0.020	0.513	0.873	0.914
Timing	Election	Campaign	Campaign	Campaign	Campaign

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 1. Column (1) uses data collected after the local elections in October 2023. Columns (2)-(5) use data from the during-campaign survey wave. We did not collect lagged values of any of the presented variables. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Inked finger*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent's finger had an ink mark up to two days after the election, and 0 otherwise; (2) *% brown stickers*: variable ranging from 0 to 1 illustrating the percentage number of brown stickers found hanging at households' front doors out of a total of 40 stickers distributed to each leader; (3) *Mobilised cyclists*: variable equal to 1 if the list left with leaders for cyclist mobilisation contained any names, and 0 otherwise; (4) # *Cyclists mobilised*: variable indicating the number of cyclists included in the lists distributed to leaders for mobilisation; (5) # *Cyclists attending*: variable indicating the number of cyclists that attended the field team's second visit out of those included in the leader's list. Additional details about the dependent variables are in the online Appendix in Table 9. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4: Program Participation

	Fam. w/ *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*	Who was involved in the program?			
		Self	Family	Block people	Rural migrants
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.074***	0.092***	0.022**	0.040**	0.053***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.016)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.083***	0.089***	0.009	0.026*	0.034**
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Observations	6112	6110	6112	6109	6104
R^2	0.208	0.238	0.164	0.183	0.142
Mean (control group)	0.703	0.584	0.093	0.293	0.281
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.479	0.860	0.214	0.406	0.237

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 3. All columns combine the two post-baseline survey waves and present results for the stacked regressions. We did not collect lagged values of any of the presented variables. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Fam. w/ "Quelimane trabalha com todos"*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent has heard of the program "Quelimane trabalha com todos"[18], and 0 otherwise; (2) *Self*: variable equal to 1 if respondent claims to have been involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Family*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent states that his/her family were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (4) *Block people*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent states that people living in their same block were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise; (5) *Rural migrants*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent states that rural migrants were involved in the program, and 0 otherwise. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table 10. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5: Employment

	Heard of job (12 months)	Heard of job through program	Working	# hours working
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.069***	0.101***	0.021	0.413***
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.155)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.082***	0.107***	-0.031**	-0.152
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.166)
Observations	6113	6113	6108	6113
R^2	0.189	0.199	0.185	0.148
Mean (control group)	0.234	0.111	0.626	4.517
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.389	0.625	0.001	0.000
Lagged dependent variable	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions using equation 3. All columns combine the two post-baseline survey waves and present results for the stacked regressions. Columns (3) and (4) include the lagged value of the dependent variable. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Heard of job (12 months)*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent has heard of a job offer in the 12 months previous to the interview date, and 0 otherwise; (2) *Heard of job through program*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent heard of a job offer through the implemented program, and 0 otherwise; (3) *Working*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent was employed at the time of the interview, and 0 otherwise; (4) # *hours working*: variable reporting the number of hours that the respondent reports having been working on the day previous to the interview date. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table 11. All specifications include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6: Political participation

	Inked finger (1)	Political objects (general) (2)	Political objects RENAMO (3)	Contacted BL (8 months) (4)	Contacted BL (4 months) (5)
(TL) Leader treatment	0.029*	0.016***	0.008	0.059***	0.026**
	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.011)
(TB) Basic treatment	0.019	0.025***	0.017***	0.007	0.014
	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.010)
Observations	3332	6111	6111	2852	3260
R^2	0.130	0.075	0.076	0.150	0.111
Mean (control group)	0.698	0.047	0.030	0.147	0.056
T1 = T2 (p-value)	0.537	0.141	0.100	0.006	0.249
Timing	Election	Pre and post-election	Pre and post-election	Pre-election	Post-election

Note. Estimates based on OLS regressions. Columns (1), (4), and (5) use equation 1 whereas columns (2)-(3) use equation 3. Column (1) uses data from the voting confirmation data collection. Columns (2)-(3) combine the two post-baseline survey waves and present results for the stacked regressions. Column (4) presents uses data from the pre-election survey wave. Column (5) uses data from the post-election survey wave. We did not collect lagged values of any of the presented variables. Dependent variables by column: (1) *Inked finger*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent had the right index marked with purple ink at the time of the field team visit[19]; (2)-(3) *Political objects (general)*: variable equal to 1 if the field administrator identified any objects with a political content held by the respondent; (4)-(5) *Political objects RENAMO*: variable equal to 1 if, conditional on having identified political objects, these were from the RENAMO political party; (6) *Contacted BL (8 months)*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent claims to have approached the block leader in the eight months previous to the interview date; (7) *Contacted BL (4 months)*: variable equal to 1 if the respondent claims to have approached the block leader in the four months previous to the interview date. Additional details about the dependent variables are presented in the online Appendix in Table 12. The specification in column (1) includes strata fixed effects. Specifications in columns (2)-(7) include block and individual controls, and strata fixed effects. Section 4 presents the full list of controls. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the block level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

A Appendix

Treatment contents

Figure 1: Information on hospitals

Figure 2: Information on cultural events



Figure 3: Video of block leader

Sampling



Figure 4: Sample distribution by treatment group across the city

Measurement

Figure 5: Sticker leader

Timeline



Figure 6: Timeline

Outcome variables

Table 7: Set of outcomes for program knowledge

Topic	Variable and Description
Program knowledge	**Fam. w/ *"Quelimane trabalha com todos":*** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says he/she has heard of the program "Quelimane trabalha com todos", and zero otherwise. The survey question is asked literally as represented in this table, without describing any details of what the program entailed. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked in the pre-campaign (Column (1)) survey wave in May 2023 and in the post-campaign survey wave (Column (2)) in August 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.
Who's involved in the program?	**Self:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says that he/she was involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was displayed in the survey conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*. The variable was manually given a value of zero if the respondent had not heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked whether he/she was involved. The same variable was asked in the pre-campaign (Column (3)) survey wave in May 2023 and in the post-campaign survey wave (Column (4)) in August 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **Family:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says that his/her family was involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was displayed in the survey conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*. The variable was manually given a value of zero if the respondent had not heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked about whether the family was involved. The same variable was asked in the pre-campaign (Column (5)) survey wave in May 2023 and in the post-campaign survey wave (Column (6)) in August 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **Block people:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says that the people living in the same block as the respondent were involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was displayed in the survey conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*. The variable was manually given a value of zero if the respondent had not heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked about whether the people in his/her block were involved. The same variable was asked in the pre-campaign (Column (7)) survey wave in May 2023 and in the post-campaign survey wave (Column (8)) in August 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **Rural migrants:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says that rural migrants were involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was displayed in the survey conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*. The variable was manually given a value of zero if the respondent had not heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked about whether the rural migrants were involved. The same variable was asked in the pre-campaign (Column (9)) survey wave in May 2023 and in the post-campaign survey wave (Column (10)) in August 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.

Table 8: Set of outcomes for migrants' integration - leaders

Topic	Variable and Description
Perceptions towards migrants' integration	**Migs. treated unfairly.** Categorical variable with options *Never*, *Sometimes*, *Many times* and *Always* converted into a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent believes that rural migrants are unfairly treated always or many times, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported and collected during the pre-campaign survey wave in May 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **Migs. are positive.** Categorical variable with options *Very negative*, *Negative*, *Neither negative nor positve*, *Positve*, *Very positive* converted into a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondent believes that rural migrants are positive or very positive, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported and collected during the pre-campaign survey wave in May 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **Gov. integrates migs.** Categorical variable with options *Very good job*, *Good job*, *Neither good nor bad job*, *Bad job*, *Very bad job* converted into a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that the government is doing a good or very good job at integrating migrants, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported and collected during the pre-campaign survey wave in May 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.
Awareness of block migrants	**General.** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent answers that he/she personally knows migrants living in the same block as the respondent, and zero otherwise. This question did not specify any individuals. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the pre-campaign survey wave (Column (4)) in May 2023 and the during-campaign survey wave (Column (5)) in August 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **Sampled.** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent selects at least one migrant from the displayed list, and zero otherwise. For this question, the respondent was initially presented with a list of people living in the same block as the respondent. The list displayed the names of all the people in that block who were sampled for this project (migrants and residents). The respondent was asked to select the names of the people with whom he/she was acquainted. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the pre-campaign survey wave (Column (6)) in May 2023 and the during-campaign survey wave (Column (7)) in August 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **% sampled migrants.** For this question, the respondent was initially presented with a list of people living in the same block as the respondent. The list displayed the names of all the people in that block who were sampled for this project (migrants and residents). The respondent was asked to select the names of the people with whom he/she was acquainted. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, and indicates the percentage of rural migrants that the leader selects from the list out of the total number of migrants sampled in the block. The variable is self-reported by the leader. The same variable was asked during the pre-campaign survey wave in May 2023 and the during-campaign survey wave in August 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.

Table 9: Set of outcomes for political effort - leaders

Topic	Variable and Description
Political Participation	**Inked finger:** Variable equal to 1 if the respondent's finger was coloured with purple ink at the time of the field team's visit, and zero otherwise. Mozambique has a long-standing tradition of marking fingers with ink after voting as a sign of voting participation. The ink mark should stay up to two or three days after. The field team visited the entire project sample two days following the election to check for the ink mark on the fingers. This measurement was collected in October 2023.
Political effort	**% Brown stickers:** Variable ranging from 0 to 1 as a percentage of brown stickers found hanging at the front doors of the blocks' inhabitants. Each leader received 40 brown stickers and was instructed to distribute them to the population living in their block. This variable is computed as the total number out of the 40 distributed found by the field team up to two weeks after the initial distribution. **Mobilised cyclists:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the list contained at least one name of cyclists to participate in the political bicycle rallies, and zero otherwise. Quelimane is largely dependent on bicycle taxi drivers as its main transportation method. These drivers have often been used by the incumbent Mayor to do political campaigns by organising bicycle rallies. The leaders in our sample were given a blank list to fill with names of bicycle taxi drivers living in their blocks that could be mobilised for these rallies. Two days before this visit, the block leaders were informed that a team of field administrators would visit them again to collect these lists and were requested to summon the people in these contained to attend the visit. The field enumerators collected these lists up to two weeks after the initial visit and confirmed whether these people existed with a phone call. The variable reflects whether the list contained at least one *"true"* name (extensive margin). **# Cyclists mobilised:** Variable counting the number of cyclists' names on the list distributed to the leaders. Quelimane is largely dependent on bicycle taxi drivers as its main transportation method. These drivers have often been used by the incumbent Mayor to do political campaigns by organising bicycle rallies. The leaders in our sample were given a blank list to fill with names of bicycle taxi drivers living in their blocks that could be mobilised for these rallies. Two days before this visit, the block leaders were informed that a team of field administrators would visit them again to collect these lists and were requested to summon the people in these contained to attend the visit. The field enumerators collected these lists up to two weeks after the initial visit and confirmed whether these people existed by confirming their attendance or by phone. The variable reflects the total number of *"true"* names contained on these lists (intensive margin). **Cyclists attending:** Variable counting the number of bicycle taxi drivers that attended the field team's second visit two weeks after the initial list distribution. Quelimane is largely dependent on bicycle taxi drivers as its main transportation method. The incumbent Mayor has often used these drivers to do political campaigns by organising bicycle rallies. The leaders in our sample were given a blank list to fill with names of bicycle taxi drivers living in their blocks that could be mobilised for these rallies. The field enumerators collected these lists up to two weeks after the initial visit and confirmed whether these people existed with a phone call. Two days before this visit, the block leaders were informed that a team of field administrators would visit them again to collect these lists and were requested to summon the people in these contained to attend the visit. This variable counts the number of people on the list that attended the field team's visit.

Table 10: Set of outcomes for program knowledge - migrants

Topic	Variable and Description
Program knowledge	**Fam. w/ *"Quelimane trabalha com todos":*** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says he/she has heard of the program "Quelimane trabalha com todos", and zero otherwise. The survey question is asked literally as represented in this table, without describing any details of what the program entailed. The variable is self-reported. The variable was asked in the pre-elections survey wave in June 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.
Who's involved in the program?	**Self:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says that he/she was involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was displayed in the survey conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*. The variable was manually given a value of zero if the respondent had not heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked whether he/she was involved. The variable was asked in the pre-elections survey wave in June 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **Family:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says that his/her family was involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was displayed in the survey conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*. The variable was manually given a value of zero if the respondent had not heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked about whether the family was involved. The variable was asked in the pre-elections survey wave in June 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **Block people:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says that the people living in the same block as the respondent were involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was displayed in the survey conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*. The variable was manually given a value of zero if the respondent had not heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked about whether the people in his/her block were involved. The variable was asked in the pre-elections survey wave in June 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **Rural migrants:** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent says that rural migrants were involved in the program, and zero otherwise. This question was displayed in the survey conditional on having responded positively to being familiar with the program *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*. The variable was manually given a value of zero if the respondent had not heard of the program before. The respondent was directly asked about whether the rural migrants were involved. The variable was asked in the pre-elections survey wave in June 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.

Table 11: Set of outcomes for employment - migrants

Topic	Variable and Description
Job opportunities	**Heard of job (12 months)**: Variable equal to 1 if respondent heard of a job opening in the 12 months previous to the interview, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported by the migrant. This variable was collected in the pre-elections survey wave in June 2023. The same variable was not asked during the baseline survey wave. **Heard of job through program**: Variable equal to 1 if the respondent heard of a job opening through the program *"Quelimane trabalha com todos"*, and zero otherwise. This variable was displayed in the survey conditional on having heard of a job opening in the 12 months previous to the interview date. It was manually assigned to a zero if respondents hadn't heard of a job opening. With this said, it represents all respondents who heard of a job opening through the program in the 12 months before the interview date. The variable is self-reported by the migrant. This variable was collected in the pre-elections survey wave in June 2023. The same survey question was not asked during the baseline survey wave.
Employment	**Working:** Variable equal to 1 if the respondent is currently employed and earning monetary compensation, and zero otherwise. Variable constructed from a categorical variable with multiple employment options, converted to 1 if the respondent selects any option other than student, retired or unemployed, and zero otherwise. The variable is self-reported by the migrant. The same variable was asked during the pre-elections (Column (3)) survey wave in June 2023 and in the post-elections (Column (4)) survey wave in November/December 2023. The same survey question was asked during the baseline survey wave and is included as a control variable in the displayed regression. **# hours working:** The variable is constructed out of a subset of 24 other variables, one for each hour of the day before the interview date, in which the respondent is asked about the activity conducted (options include *sleeping* or *eating*, for example). This variable is constructed by summing the number of hours the respondent reported being at work - urban or rural. The variable is self-reported. The same variable was asked during the pre-elections (Column (5)) survey wave in June 2023 and in the post-elections (Column (6)) survey wave in November/December 2023. The same survey question was asked during the baseline survey wave and is included as a control variable in the displayed regression.

Table 12: Set of outcomes for political participation - migrants

Topic	Variable and Description
Political participation	**Inked finger:** Variable equal to 1 if the respondent's finger was coloured with purple ink at the time of the field team's visit, and zero otherwise. Mozambique has a long-standing tradition of marking fingers with ink after voting as a sign of voting participation. The ink mark should stay up to two or three days after. The field team visited the entire project sample two days following the election to check for the ink mark on the fingers. This measurement was collected in October 2023. **Political objects (Observation):** Variable equal to 1 if the respondent had any object with political affiliation in the living place - these included hats, t-shirts, posters, pins, or others - and zero otherwise. The variable is observational: the field administrator was instructed not to ask the question but to observe the surroundings and report if any items were found. The same question was included in the pre-elections survey wave (Column (2)) in June 2023 and in the post-elections survey wave (Column (3)) in November/December 2023. The same survey question was not collected during the baseline survey wave. **Political objects RENAMO:** This variable was displayed on the survey conditional on the field administrator having observed any items with a political affiliation at the respondents' living place and is equal to 1 if the objects identified by the field administrator belonged to the political party RENAMO - the political party currently in power in the city -, and zero otherwise. The variable was manually assigned a value of zero if the field administrator did not identify any political objects in the living place. The same question was included in the pre-elections survey wave (Column (4)) in June 2023 and in the post-elections survey wave (Column (5)) in November/December 2023. The same survey question was not collected during the baseline survey wave.
Block leader	**Contacted BL (8 months):** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent contacted the block leader in the eight months before the interview date, and zero otherwise. The question did not discriminate the purpose of such contact. The variable is self-reported by the migrant. This variable was collected during the pre-elections survey wave in June 2023. The same survey question was not asked for the baseline survey wave. **Contacted BL (4 months):** Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent contacted the block leader in the four months before the interview date, and zero otherwise. The question did not discriminate the purpose of such contact. The variable is self-reported by the migrant. This variable was collected during the post-elections survey wave in November/December 2023. The same survey question was not asked for the baseline survey wave.

Additional results

Table 13: Balance table - leaders

	Mean control (1)	Any treat (2)	TL (3)	TB (4)	p-value (5)	N (6)
Age	49.91	-1.00	-0.54	-1.46	0.61	441
	[12.21]	(1.22)	(1.39)	(1.47)		
Male	0.67	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.92	441
	[0.47]	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Married/cohabiting	0.72	-0.01	0.02	-0.03	0.60	441
	[0.45]	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Catholic	0.66	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	0.79	441
	[0.48]	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Literate	0.78	-0.03	-0.00	-0.06	0.48	441
	[0.42]	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Primary schooling	0.42	-0.02	-0.00	-0.05	0.74	441
	[0.49]	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Own dwelling	0.95	0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.80	441
	[0.23]	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Likes migrants	0.77	0.05	0.02	0.08	0.33	431
	[0.42]	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Gov. is helping the poor	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.59	434
	[0.14]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		

Note. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation for the whole sample. Column (2) reports the difference between both treatment groups pooled together and the control group using and OLS regression of the corresponding characteristic on the treatment indicator. Columns (3) and (4) report the differences between the leader/basic treatment and the control group, respectively. Column (5) presents a joint test of significance of the coefficients for each treatment dummy (TL, TB). Column (6) reports the number of observations at baseline.

Table 14: Balance table - migrants

	Mean control (1)	Any treat (2)	TL (3)	TB (4)	p-value (5)	N (6)
Age	24.32	-0.31	-0.27	-0.34	0.55	3583
	[8.43]	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.32)		
Male	0.66	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.03	0.18	3633
	[0.48]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Married/cohabiting	0.37	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.77	3628
	[0.48]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Number of children	1.16	-0.02	-0.00	-0.03	0.83	3508
	[1.68]	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Catholic	0.59	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.63	3520
	[0.49]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Iliterate	0.66	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.48	3610
	[0.47]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Primary schooling	0.32	0.03*	0.02	0.03*	0.19	3630
	[0.47]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Primary occupation: none	0.22	-0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.07	2313
	[0.42]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Contacted local leader (last 12 months)	0.24	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.79	2106
	[0.63]	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Moved to work	0.50	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	0.74	3633
	[0.50]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Main struggle w/ moving: finding a job	0.33	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.32	3633
	[0.47]	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Main struggle w/ moving: making friends	0.14	0.02	0.00	0.03**	0.04	3633
	[0.34]	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		

Note. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation for the whole sample. Column (2) reports the difference between both treatment groups pooled together and the control group using and OLS regression of the corresponding characteristic on the treatment indicator. Columns (3) and (4) report the differences between the leader/basic treatment and the control group, respectively. Column (5) presents a joint test of significance of the coefficients for each treatment dummy (TL, TB). Column (6) reports the number of observations at baseline.